The Cause and Effects of the Atomic Bombings
HIROSHIMA--from the top of the Red Cross Hospital looking northwest.
Frame buildings recently erected.
THE ATTACKS AND DAMAGE
1. The attacks.--
A
single atomic bomb, the first weapon of its type ever used against a target,
exploded over the city of Hiroshima at 0815 on the morning of 6 August 1945.
Most of the industrial workers had already reported to work, but many workers
were enroute and nearly all the school children and some industrial employees
were at work in the open on the program of building removal to provide
firebreaks and disperse valuables to the country. The attack came 45 minutes
after the "all clear" had been sounded from a previous alert. Because
of the lack of warning and the populace's indifference to small groups of
planes, the explosion came as an almost complete surprise, and the people had
not taken shelter. Many were caught in the open, and most of the rest in
flimsily constructed homes or commercial establishments.
The bomb exploded slightly northwest of the center of the
city. Because of this accuracy and the flat terrain and circular shape of the
city, Hiroshima was uniformly and extensively devastated. Practically the entire
densely or moderately built-up portion of the city was leveled by blast and
swept by fire. A "fire-storm," a phenomenon which has occurred
infrequently in other conflagrations, developed in Hiroshima: fires springing
up almost simultaneously over the wide flat area around the center of the city
drew in air from all directions. The inrush of air easily overcame the natural
ground wind, which had a velocity of only about 5 miles per hour. The
"fire-wind" attained a maximum velocity of 30 to 40 miles per hour 2
to 3 hours after the explosion. The "fire-wind" and the symmetry of
the built-up center of the city gave a roughly circular shape to the 4.4 square
miles which were almost completely burned out.
The surprise, the collapse of many buildings, and the
conflagration contributed to an unprecedented casualty rate. Seventy to eighty
thousand people were killed, or missing and presumed dead, and an equal number
were injured. The magnitude of casualties is set in relief by a comparison with
the Tokyo fire raid of 9-10 March 1945, in which, though nearly 16 square miles
were destroyed, the number killed was no larger, and fewer people were injured.
At Nagasaki, 3 days later, the city was scarcely more
prepared, though vague references to the Hiroshima disaster had appeared in the
newspaper of 8 August. From the Nagasaki Prefectural Report on the bombing,
something of the shock of the explosion can be inferred:
The day was clear with not very much wind--an ordinary
midsummer's day. The strain of continuous air attack on the city's population
and the severity of the summer had vitiated enthusiastic air raid precautions.
Previously, a general alert had been sounded at 0748, with a raid alert at
0750; this was canceled at 0830, and the alertness of the people was dissipated
by a great feeling of relief.
The city remained on the warning alert, but when two B-29's
were again sighted coming in the raid signal was not given immediately; the
bomb was dropped at 1102 and the raid signal was given a few minutes later, at
1109. Thus only about 400 people were in the city's tunnel shelters, which were
adequate for about 30 percent of the population.
When the atomic bomb exploded, an intense flash was observed
first, as though a large amount of magnesium had been ignited, and the scene
grew hazy with white smoke. At the same time at the center of the explosion,
and a short while later in other areas, a tremendous roaring sound was heard
and a crushing blast wave and intense heat were felt.
The people of Nagasaki, even those who lived on the outer
edge of the blast, all felt as though they had sustained a direct hit, and the
whole city suffered damage such as would have resulted from direct hits
everywhere by ordinary bombs.
The zero area, where the damage was most severe, was almost
completely wiped out and for a short while after the explosion no reports came
out of that area. People who were in comparatively damaged areas reported their
condition under the impression that they had received a direct hit. If such a
great amount of damage could be wreaked by a near miss, then the power of the
atomic bomb is unbelievably great.
In Nagasaki, no fire storm arose, and the uneven terrain of
the city confined the maximum intensity of damage to the valley over which the
bomb exploded. The area of nearly complete devastation was thus much smaller;
only about 1.8 square miles. Casualties were lower also; between 35,000 and
40,000 were killed, and about the same number injured. People in the tunnel
shelters escaped injury, unless exposed in the entrance shaft.
The difference in the totals of destruction to lives and
property at the two cities suggests the importance of the special circumstances
of layout and construction of the cities, which affect the results of the
bombings and must be considered in evaluating the effectiveness of the atomic
bombs. An account of the nature and history of each city will give meaning to
the details of the damage and disorganization at each.
2. Hiroshima.--
The
city of Hiroshima is located on the broad fan-shaped delta of the Ota River,
whose 7 mouths divide the city into 6 islands which project fingerlike into
Hiroshima Bay of the Inland Sea. These mouths of the river furnished excellent
firebreaks in a city that is otherwise flat and only slightly above sea level.
A highly developed bridge system, with 81 important bridges, joined the
islands. A single kidney shaped hill in the eastern part of the city, about
one-half mile long and rising to an elevation of 221 feet, offered some blast
protection to structures on the eastern side opposite the point of fall of the
bomb. Otherwise, the city was uniformly exposed to the spreading energy from
the bomb.
The city boundary extends to some low hills to the west and
northeast and embraces 26.36 square miles, only 13 of which were built up.
Seven square miles were densely or moderately built up, the remainder being
occupied by sparsely built-up residential, storage, and transportation areas,
vegetable farms, water courses, and wooded hilly sections. In the central area,
no systematic separation of commercial, industrial, and residential zones
existed, though there were rough functional sections. The main commercial
district was located in the center of the city, and with the adjoining Chugoku
Regional Army Headquarters occupied the greater portion of the central area.
The bulk of the industries was located on the perimeter of the city, either on
the southern ends of the islands (where the Hiroshima airport was also
situated) or to the east of the city. The 4 square miles of densely built-up area
in the heart of the city--residential, commercial, and military--contained
three-fifths of the total population. If there were, as seems probable, about
245,000 people in the city at the time of the attack, the density in the
congested area must have been about 35,000 per square mile. Five completed
evacuation programs and a sixth then in progress had reduced the population
from its wartime peak of 380,000.
In Hiroshima (and in Nagasaki also) the dwellings were of
wood construction; about one-half were one story and the remainder either one
and one-half or two stories. The roof coverings were mostly hard-burnt black
tile. There were no masonry division walls, and large groups of dwellings
clustered together. The type of construction, coupled with antiquated
fire-fighting equipment and inadequately trained personnel, afforded even in
peacetime a high possibility of conflagration. Many wood-framed industrial
buildings were of poor construction by American standards. The principal points
of weakness were the extremely small tenons, the inadequate tension joints, and
the inadequate or poorly designed lateral bracings.
Reinforced concrete framed buildings showed a striking lack
of uniformity in design and in quality of materials. Some of the construction
details (reinforcing rod splices, for example) were often poor, and much of the
concrete was definitely weak; thus some reinforced concrete buildings collapsed
and suffered structural damage when within 2,000 feet of ground zero, and some
internal wall paneling was demolished even up to 3,800 feet. (For convenience,
the term "ground zero" will be used to designate the point on the
ground directly beneath the point of detonation, or "air zero.")
Other buildings, however, were constructed far more strongly
than is required by normal building codes in America, to resist earthquakes.
Furthermore, construction regulations in Japan have specified since the 1923
earthquake that the roof must safely carry a minimum load of 70 pounds per
square foot whereas American requirements do not normally exceed 40 pounds per
square foot for similar types. Though the regulation was not always followed,
this extra strong construction was encountered in some of the buildings near
ground zero at Hiroshima, and undoubtedly accounts for their ability to
withstand atomic bomb pressures without structural failures.
Nearly 7 percent of the residential units had been torn down to make
firebreaks.
Hiroshima before the war was the seventh largest city in
Japan, with a population of over 340,000, and was the principal administrative
and commercial center of the southwestern part of the country. As the
headquarters of the Second Army and of the Chugoku Regional Army, it was one of
the most important military command stations in Japan, the site of one of the
largest military supply depots, and the foremost military shipping point for
both troops and supplies. Its shipping activities had virtually ceased by the
time of the attack, however, because of sinkings and the mining of the Inland
Sea. It had been relatively unimportant industrially before the war, ranking
only twelfth, but during the war new plants were built that increased its
significance. These factories were not concentrated, but spread over the
outskirts of the city; this location, we shall see, accounts for the slight
industrial damage.
The impact of the atomic bomb shattered the normal fabric of
community life and disrupted the organizations for handling the disaster. In
the 30 percent of the population killed and the additional 30 percent seriously
injured were included corresponding proportions of the civic authorities and
rescue groups. A mass flight from the city took place, as persons sought safety
from the conflagration and a place for shelter and food. Within 24 hours,
however, people were streaming back by the thousands in search of relatives and
friends and to determine the extent of their property loss. Road blocks had to
be set up along all routes leading into the city, to keep curious and
unauthorized people out. The bulk of the dehoused population found refuge in
the surrounding countryside; within the city the food supply was short and
shelter virtually nonexistent.
On 7 August, the commander of the Second Army assumed
general command of the counter measures, and all military units and facilities
in the area were mobilized for relief purposes. Army buildings on the periphery
of the city provided shelter and emergency hospital space, and dispersed Army
supplies supplemented the slight amounts of food and clothing that had escaped
destruction. The need far exceeded what could be made available. Surviving
civilians assisted; although casualties in both groups had been heavy, 190
policemen and over 2,000 members of the Civilian Defense Corps reported for
duty on 7 August.
The status of medical facilities and personnel dramatically
illustrates the difficulties facing authorities. Of more than 200 doctors in
Hiroshima before the attack, over 90 percent were casualties and only about 30
physicians were able to perform their normal duties a month after the raid. Out
of 1,780 nurses, 1,654 were killed or injured. Through some stocks of supplies
had been dispersed, many were destroyed.
Only three out of 45 civilian hospitals could be used, and
two large Army hospitals were rendered unusable. Those within 3,000 feet of
ground zero were totally destroyed, and the mortality rate of the occupants was
practically 100 percent. Two large hospitals of reinforced concrete
construction were located 4,900 feet from ground zero. The basic structures
remained erect but there was such severe interior damage that neither was able
to resume operation as a hospital for some time and the casualty rate was
approximately 90 percent, due primarily to falling plaster, flying glass, and
fire. Hospitals and clinics beyond 7,000 feet, though often remaining standing,
were badly damaged and contained many casualties from flying glass or other
missiles.
With such elimination of facilities and personnel, the lack
of care and rescue activities at the time of the disaster is understandable;
still, the eyewitness account of Father Siemes1 shows how this lack of first-aid contributed to the
seriousness of casualties. At the improvised first-aid stations, he reports:
*
* * Iodine is applied to the wounds but they are left uncleansed. Neither
ointment nor other therapeutic agents are available. Those that have been
brought in are laid on the floor and no one can give them any further care.
What could one do when all means are lacking? Among the passerby, there are
many who are uninjured. In a purposeless, insensate manner, distraught by the
magnitude of the disaster, most of them rush by and none conceives the thought of
organizing help on his own initiative. They are concerned only with the welfare
of their own families--in the official aid stations and hospitals, a good third
or half of those that had been brought in died. They lay about there almost
without care, and a very high percentage succumbed. Everything was lacking,
doctors, assistants, dressings, drugs, etc. * * *
Effective
medical help had to be sent in from in the outside, and arrived only after a
considerable delay.
Fire-fighting
and rescue units were equally stripped of men and equipment. Father Siemes
reports
that 30 hours elapsed before any organized rescue parties were observed. In
Hiroshima, only 16 pieces of fire-fighting equipment were available for
fighting the conflagration, three of them borrowed. However, it is unlikely
that any public fire department in the world, even without damage to equipment
or casualties to personnel, could have prevented development of a conflagration
in Hiroshima, or combated it with success at more than a few locations along
its perimeter. The total fire damage would not have been much different.
All
utilities and transportation services were disrupted over varying lengths of
time. In most cases, however, the demand fell off even more precipitously than
the available supply, and where the service was needed it could be restored at
a minimal level. Thus, through railroad service was possible on 8 August, only
2 days after the attack, when fire trucks still had to be used to pump water
into the locomotives because of insufficient water pressure. Electric power
from the general network was available in most of the surviving parts of the
city on 7 August, and only one plant, the Engineering Division of Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, was hampered in its recovery by the inability to obtain
sufficient power for several weeks.
The
water reservoir, which was of reinforced concrete and earth-covered, was
undamaged; it was nearly 2 miles from the blast center. However, 70,000 breaks
of pipe connections in buildings and dwellings were caused by blast and fire
effects. No subsurface pipes were crushed and no leaks resulted from blast as a
direct cause, though several leaks in underground mains resulted from falling
debris. Pressure in the city center dropped to zero because of the connection
breaks and the damage to a 16- and a 14-inch water main where they crossed damaged
bridges. Sex sewer pumping stations were rendered inoperable by fire and blast
within a radius of 1 mile. The remaining eight stations were only slightly
damaged, but no effort was made to repair or operate them. Water tables rose at
flood periods and lands behind revetments were inundated.
Trolley
cars, trucks, and railroad rolling stock suffered extensive damage.
Transportation buildings (offices, stations, living quarters, and a few
warehouses) were damaged by fire in the passenger station area, but damage was
slight to the roundhouses, transit sheds, warehouses, and repair units in the
classification and repair area. About 200 railroad employees were killed, but
by 20 August, 14 days after the attack, 80 percent of the employees were at
work.
The
electric power transmission and distribution system was wrecked; only power
equipment of rugged construction, such as transformers, resisted the blast and
heat within the devastated areas. Instruments were damaged beyond repair, and
switches, switchyard insulators, cables, and copper bus work were rendered
unusable. The telephone system was approximately 80 percent damaged, and no
service was restored until 15 August 1945.
Industry
in the center of the city was effectively wiped out. Though small workshops
numbered several thousand, they represented only one-fourth of the total
industrial production of Hiroshima, since many of them had only one or two
workers. The bulk of the city's output came from large plants located on the
outskirts of the city; one-half of the industrial production came from only
five firms. Of these larger companies, only one suffered more than superficial
damage. Of their working force, 94 percent were uninjured. Since electric power
was available, and materials and working force were not destroyed, plants
ordinarily responsible for nearly three-fourths of Hiroshima's industrial
production could have resumed normal operation within 30 days of the attack had
the war continued.
Immediately
after the attack, the presence of these nearly intact industries spurred
countermeasures in an effort to retain for the nation's war effort the
potential output of the city. The prefectural governor issued a proclamation on
7 August, calling for "a rehabilitation of the stricken city and an aroused
fighting spirit to exterminate the devilish Americans." To prevent the
spread of rumors and brace morals, 210,000 out-of-town newspapers were brought
in daily to replace the destroyed local paper. With the surrender, however,
reconstruction took on a slower tempo. On 16 August, regular rationing was
resumed. Care of the injured and disposal of corpses remained urgent, but other
steps were few.
By
1 November, the population of Hiroshima was back to 137,000. The city required
complete rebuilding. The entire heart, the main administrative and commercial
as well as residential section, was gone. In this area only about 50 buildings,
all of reinforced concrete, remained standing. All of these suffered blast
damage and all save about a dozen were almost completely gutted by fire; only 5
could be used without major repairs.
These
burnt-out structural frames rose impressively from the ashes of the burned-over
section where occasional piles of rubble or twisted steel skeletons marked the
location of brick or steel frame structures. At greater distances light steel
frame and brick structures remained undamaged. Blast damage to wood-frame
buildings and to residences extended well beyond the burned-over area,
gradually becoming more erratic and spotty as distances were reached where only
the weakest buildings were damaged, until in the outer portions of the city
only minor disturbances of the tile roofs or breakage of glass were visible.
The official Japanese figures summed up the building destruction at 62,000 out
of a total of 90,000 buildings in the urban area, or 69 percent. An additional
6,000 or 6.6 percent were severely damaged, and most of the others showed glass
breakage or disturbance of roof tile. These figures show the magnitude of the
problem facing the survivors.
Despite
the absence of sanitation measures, no epidemics are reported to have broken
out. In view of the lack of medical facilities, supplies, and personnel, and
the disruption of the sanitary system, the escape from epidemics may seem
surprising. The experience of other bombed cities in Germany and Japan shows
that this is not an isolated case. A possible explanation may lie in the
disinfecting action of the extensive fires. In later weeks, disease rates rose,
but not sharply.
3. Nagasaki--
Nagasaki is located on the best
natural harbor of western Kyushu, a spacious inlet in the mountainous coast.
The city is a highly congested urban pattern extending for several miles along
the narrow shores and up the valleys opening out from the harbor. Two rivers,
divided by a mountain spur, form the two main valleys in whose basins the city
lies: the Urakami River, in whose basin the atomic bomb fell, running into the
harbor from a NNW direction, and the Nakashima River, running from the NE. This
mountain spur and the irregular layout of the city effectively reduced the area
of destruction.
The
main residential and commercial districts are intermingled in these two river
basins. The large industrial plants stretch up the west shore of the bay and up
the Urakami Valley. Though the metropolitan area of the city is officially
about 35 square miles and stretches far into the countryside, the heavily
built-up area is confined by the terrain to less than 4 square miles. The
greatest population density thus approximated 65,000 per square mile even after
the evacuations.
Despite
its excellent harbor, Nagasaki's commercial importance, though great in
previous centuries, had declined in recent years because of the city's isolated
peninsular position and the difficulties of transportation through the
mountains by inadequate roads and railroad facilities. As a naval base it had
been supplanted by Sasebo. Industry gradually increased in importance,
primarily under Mitsubishi influence. The four largest companies in the city were
the Mitsubishi Shipyards, Electrical Equipment Works, Arms Plant, and Steel
Works, employing nearly 90 percent of the city's labor force. Administratively,
Nagasaki was by 1941 of merely local importance despite being the seat of the
prefectural government.
Before
the atomic bombing on 9 August, Nagasaki had experienced five small-scale air
attacks in the previous 12 months, by an aggregate of 136 planes which dropped
a total of 270 tons of high explosive, 53 tons of incendiary, and 20 tons of
fragmentation bombs.
Of
these, a raid of 1 August 1945 was most effective, with several bombs falling
in the Mitsubishi Shipyards and Steel Works. The scale of effect can be roughly
measured, however, by comparing the toll of building damage with that from the
atomic bomb; in all these raids 276 residential buildings and 21 industrial
buildings were destroyed or badly damaged. When the atomic bomb fell, Nagasaki
was comparatively intact.
Because
the most intense destruction was confined to the Urakami Valley, the impact of
the bomb on the city as a whole was less shattering than at Hiroshima. In
addition, no fire storm occurred; indeed, a shift in wind direction helped
control the fires. Medical personnel and facilities were hard-hit, however.
Over 80 percent of the city's hospital beds and the Medical College were
located within 3,000 feet of the center of the explosion, and were completely
destroyed. Reinforced concrete buildings within this range, though standing ,
were completely gutted by fire; buildings of wooden construction were destroyed
by fire and blast. The mortality rate in this group of buildings was between 75
and 80 percent. Exact casualty figures for medical personnel are unknown, but
the city seems to have fared better than Hiroshima: 120 doctors were at work on
1 November, about one-half of the preraid roster.
Casualties
were undoubtedly high: 600 out of 850 medical students at the Nagasaki Medical
College were killed and most of the others injured; and of the 20 faculty
members, 12 were killed and 4 others injured.
Utilities
and services were again disrupted. Both gas plants were destroyed, and the
replacement time was estimated at several months. Though the basic water supply
was not affected, thousands of residential feeder-line breaks were supplemented
by eight breaks on a 14-inch main line and four breaks where another main line
crossed a bridge. Electric power distribution and transmission systems were
effectively destroyed in the area of heaviest destruction, but power could be
supplied to the other parts of the city almost immediately.
Shipping
was virtually unaffected. Trolley service was halted both by the interruption
in power supply and by damage to street cars. Nagasaki is at the end of a
railroad spur line. The major damage was sustained by track and railroad
bridges. The rails buckled intermittently for a bridges. The rails buckled
intermittently for a distance of 5,000 to 7,500 feet from ground zero, at
points where burning debris set fire to wooden cross ties. Three bridges were
displaced; rails were distorted and the tracks had to be completely rebuilt.
The railroad stations were completely destroyed by blast and fire and the
electric signal destroyed by blast and fire and the electric signal system was
severely damaged. Rolling stock was slightly damaged, primarily by fire.
Although the damage to equipment was not extensive, it was severe enough to
curtail traffic for 48 hours, during which time sufficient emergency repair
work was performed to permit resumption of limited traffic.
Control
of relief measures was in the hands of the prefecture. The sequence of
clearance and repair activities illustrates the activities that were carried
on. The city's repair facilities were completely disorganized by the atomic
bomb, so that with the single exception of shutting off water to the affected
areas no repairs were made to roads, bridges, water mains, or transportation
installations by city forces. The prefecture took full responsibility for such
restoration as was accomplished, delegating to the scattered city help the task
of assisting in relief of victims.
There
were only 3 survivors of 115 employees of the street car company, and late as
the middle of November 1945 no cars were running. A week after the explosion,
the water works officials made an effort to supply water to persons attempting
to live in the bombed-out areas, but the leakage was so great that the effort
was abandoned. It fell to the prefecture, therefore, to institute recovery
measures even in those streets normally the responsibility of the city. Of the
entire public works construction group covering the Nagasaki city area, only
three members appeared for work and a week was required to locate and notify
other survivors.
On
the morning of 10 August, police rescue units and workers from the Kawaminami
shipbuilding works began the imperative task of clearing the Omura-Nagasaki
pike, which was impassable for 8,000 feet. A path 6 1/2 feet wide was cleared
despite the intense heat from smoldering fires, and by 15 August had been widened
to permit two-way traffic. No trucks, only rakes and shovels, were available
for clearing the streets, which were filled with tile, bricks, stone,
corrugated iron, machinery, plaster, and stucco. Street areas affected by blast
and not by fire were littered with wood.
Throughout
the devastated area, all wounded had to be carried by stretcher, since no motor
vehicles were able to proceed through the cluttered streets for several days.
The plan for debris removal required clearance of a few streets leading to the
main highway; but there were frequent delays caused by the heat of smoldering
fires and by calls for relief work. The debris was simply raked and shoveled
off the streets. By 20 August the job was considered complete. The streets were
not materially damaged by the bomb nor were the surface or the abutments of the
concrete bridges, but many of the wooden bridges were totally or partially
destroyed by fire.
Under
the circumstances--fire, flight of entire families, destruction of official
records, mass cremation--identification of dead and the accurate count of
casualties was impossible. As at Hiroshima, the season of the year made rapid
disposal of bodies imperative, and mass cremation and mass burial were resorted
to in the days immediately after the attack. Despite the absence of sanitary
measures, no epidemics broke out here. The dysentery rate rose from 25 per
100,000 to 125 per 100,000. A census taken on 1 November 1945 found a
population of 142,700 in the city.
At
Nagasaki, the scale of destruction was greater than at Hiroshima, though the
actual area destroyed was smaller because of the terrain and the point of fall
of the bomb. The Nagasaki Prefectural Report describes vividly the impress of
the bomb on the city and its inhabitants:
Within
a radius of 1 kilometer from ground zero, men and animals died almost
instantaneously from the tremendous blast pressure and heat; houses and other
structures were smashed, crushed and scattered; and fires broke out. The strong
complex steel members of the structures of the Mitsubishi Steel Works were bent
and twisted like jelly and the roofs of the reinforced concrete National
Schools were crumpled and collapsed, indicating a force beyond imagination.
Trees of all sizes lost their branches or were uprooted or broken off at the
trunk.
Outside
a radius of 1 kilometer and within a radius of 2 kilometers from ground zero,
some men and animals died instantly from the great blast and heat, but the
great majority were seriously or superficially injured. Houses and other
structures were completely destroyed while fires broke out everywhere. Trees
were uprooted and withered by the heat.
Outside
a radius of 2 kilometers and within a radius of 4 kilometers from ground zero,
men and animals suffered various degrees of injury from window glass and other
fragments scattered about by the blast and many were burned by the intense
heat. Dwelling and other structures were half damaged by blast.
Outside
a radius of 4 kilometers and within a radius of 8 kilometers from the ground
zero, living creatures were injured by materials blown about by the blast; the
majority were only superficially wounded. Houses were half or only partially
damaged.
While
the conflagration with its uniformly burnt-out area caught the attention at
Hiroshima, the blast effects, with their resemblance to the aftermath of a
hurricane, were most striking at Nagasaki. Concrete buildings had their sides
facing the blast stove in like boxes. Long lines of steel-framed factory sheds,
over a mile from ground zero, leaned their skeletons away from the explosion.
Blast resistant objects such as telephone poles leaned away from the center of
the explosion; on the surrounding hills trees were blown down within
considerable areas. Although there was no general conflagration, fires
contributed to the total damage in nearly all concrete structures. Evidence of
primary fire is more frequent than at Hiroshima.
Because
parts of the city were protected by hills, more than one-half of the
residential units escaped serious damage. Of the 52,000 residential units in
the city on 1 August, 14,146 or 27.2 percent were completely destroyed (by
Japanese count) (11,494 of these were burned); 5,441 or 10.5 percent were
half-burned or destroyed; many of the remaining units suffered superficial or
minor damage. In 558 nonresidential buildings in the built-up area of Nagasaki
which the Survey studied, almost 60 percent of the usable floor area was destroyed
or structurally damaged. Only 12 percent was undamaged, the rest suffering
superficial or minor damage.
The
survival of a higher percentage of the buildings, then, distinguishes Nagasaki
from Hiroshima, so also, on the other hand, does the damage to factories. In
Nagasaki, only the Mitsubishi Dockyards among the major industries was remote
enough from the explosion to escape serious damage. The other three Mitsubishi
firms, which were responsible together with the dockyards for over 90 percent of
the industrial output of the city, were seriously damaged. The Arms Plant and
the Steel Works were in the main area of damage. Plant officials estimated that
58 percent of the value of the former and 78 percent of the value of the latter
were destroyed : Survey investigators considered the two plants to be 50
percent destroyed. The Mitsubishi Electric Works were on the edge of the main
area of destruction, but suffered 10 percent structural damage.
One
or two paragraphs from the report of the commanding officer of Sasebo Naval
District will illustrate the sort of damage done to industrial installations.
Of two plants of the Mitsubishi Arms Works, he reports:
With
the exception of the tunnel workshops and the half-underground workshops, the
Ohashi and Mori Machi Plants were completely destroyed by collapse. Reinforced
concrete structures in these plants were severely damaged internally--ceilings
collapsed, fittings of all sorts were destroyed, and equipment was damaged.
Casting and forging shops in the Ohashi Plant were destroyed by fire, which
broke out in those structures. The Mori Machi Plant was nearly completely
destroyed by fire. Taking both plants together, 60 percent of the machinery
installations was damaged. In the Ohashi Plant, from 80 to 90 percent of the
machinery can be used again; in the Mori Machi Plant only 40 to 50 percent of
the machinery can be used in the future.
Or
of the Mitsubishi Steel Works:
Plant
structures here (some north-light steel framed structures) suffered extensive
damage to roofs and walls as steel plates were blown off. The frames themselves
were bent, twisted or toppled over, and several buildings caught fire. Hardly
any of the machinery in the plant can be used again in its present condition.
However, nearly 70 percent of the machinery can be repaired.
In
general, (as has proved true with high explosive or incendiary bombs also) the
damage to machinery and other contents of a factory was less than damage to the
buildings. In addition, the air burst of the atomic bomb meant that it acted
indirectly on machine tools and other building
contents.
Though a few tools were blown over by blast, almost all the serious damage was
caused by debris from damaged buildings, overturning through mass movement of
buildings, or burning of buildings.
Thus
the extent and sort of damage to machinery depended on the construction of the
buildings housing them. In wood-frame buildings, 95 percent of the machines
were seriously damaged, but in reinforced concrete or steel framed buildings
only one-third or one-fourth of the machines were affected seriously. As would
be expected, fire caused much damage to machines in timber framed shops
(practically all of which were destroyed up to 7,000 feet from ground zero) and
some damage in other types of structure. Debris was a major cause of damage
only in certain reinforced concrete buildings, where walls and roofs collapsed.
Shortage
of raw materials had reduced operations at these four Mitsubishi plants to a
fraction of their capacity. Had the raw material situation been normal and had
the war continues, it is estimated that restoration of production would have
been possible though slow. The dockyard, which was affected mainly by the 1
August attack rather than by the atomic bomb, would have been able to produce
at 80 percent of full capacity within 3 or 4 months. The steel works would have
required a year to get into substantial production the electric works could
have resumed production at a reduced rate within 2 months and been back at
capacity within 6 months, and the arms plants would have required 15 months to
reach two-thirds of their former capacity.
GENERAL EFFECTS
1. Casualties
The most striking result of the
atomic bombs was the great number of casualties. The exact number of dead and
injured will never be known because of the confusion after the explosions.
Persons unaccounted for might have been burned beyond recognition in the
falling buildings, disposed of in one of the mass cremations of the first week
of recovery, or driven out of the city to die or recover without any record
remaining. No sure count of even the prepaid populations existed. Because of
the decline in activity in the two port cities, the constant threat of
incendiary raids, and the formal evacuation programs of the Government, an
unknown number of the inhabitants had either drifter away from the cities or
been removed according to plan. In this uncertain situation, estimates of
casualties have generally ranged between 100,000 and 180,000 for Hiroshima, and
between 50,000 and 100,000 for Nagasaki. The Survey believes the dead at
Hiroshima to have been between 70,000 and 80,000, with an equal number injured;
at Nagasaki over 35,000 dead and somewhat more than that injured seems the most
plausible estimate.
Most
of the immediate casualties did not differ from those caused by incendiary or
high-explosive raids. The outstanding difference was the presence of radiation
effects, which became unmistakable about a week after the bombing. At the time
of impact, however, the causes of death and injury were flash burns, secondary
effects of blast and falling debris, and burns from blazing buildings. No
records are available that give the relative importance of the various types of
injury, especially for those who died immediately after the explosion. Indeed,
many of these people undoubtedly died several times over, theoretically, since
each was subjected to several injuries, any one of which would have been fatal.
The Hiroshima prefectural health department placed the proportion of deaths
from burns (flash or flame) at 60 percent, from falling debris at 30 percent,
and from other injuries at 10 percent; it is generally agreed that burns caused
at least 50 percent of the initial casualties. Of those who died later, an
increasing proportion succumbed to radiation effects.
The
seriousness of these radiation effects may be measured by the fact that 95
percent of the traced survivors of the immediate explosion who were within
3,000 feet suffered from radiation disease. Colonel Stafford Warren, in his
testimony before the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, estimated that
radiation was responsible for 7 to 8 percent of the total deaths in the two
cities. Most medical investigators who spent some time in the areas feel that
this estimate is far too low; it is generally felt that no less than 15 to 20
percent of the deaths were from radiation. In addition, there were an equal
number who were casualties but survived, as well as uncounted thousands who
probably were affected by the gamma rays but not enough to produce definite
illness.
A
plausible estimate of the importance of the various causes of death would range
as follows:
Flash burns, 20 to 30 percent.
Other injuries, 50 to 60 percent.
Radiation sickness, 15 to 20 percent.
If
we examine the nature of the casualties under each group of causes we find
familiar and unfamiliar effects.
Flash
burns.--The flash of the explosion, which
was extremely brief, emitted radiant heat travelling at the speed of light.
Flash burns thus followed the explosion instantaneously. The fact that
relatively few victims suffered burns of the eyeballs should not be interpreted
as an indication that the radiant heat followed the flash, or that time was
required to build up to maximum heat intensity. The explanation is simply that
the structure of the eye is more resistant to heat than is average human skin,
and near ground zero the recessed position of the eyeball offered protection
from the overhead explosion. Peak temperatures lasted only momentarily.
Survivors
in the two cities stated that people who were in the open directly under the
explosion of the bomb were so severely burned that the skin was charred dark
brown or black and that they died within a few minutes or hours.
Among
the survivors, the burned areas of the skin showed evidence of burns almost
immediately after the explosion. At first there was marked redness, and other
evidence of thermal burns appeared within the next few minutes or hours,
depending on the degree of the burn. Uninfected burns healed promptly without
any unusual clinical features, according to the Japanese physicians who
attended the cases. American medical observers noted only a tendency to
formation of excess scar tissue, which could be satisfactorily explained as the
result of malnutrition and the large degree of secondary infection that
complicated healing of the burns. There were also a few instances of burns
healing with contractures and limitation of the mobility of certain joints,
such as the elbows or knees. In many instances, these primary burns of minor
nature were completely healed before patients developed evidence of radiation
effects.
Because
of the brief duration of the flash wave and the shielding effects of almost any
objects--leaves and clothing as well as buildings--there were many interesting
cases of protection. The radiant heat came in a direct line like light, so that
the area burned corresponded to this directed exposure. Persons whose sides
were toward the explosion often showed definite burns of both sides of the back
while the hollow of the back escaped. People in buildings or houses were
apparently burned only if directly exposed through the windows. The most
striking instance was that of a man writing before a window. His hands were
seriously burned but his exposed face and neck suffered only slight burns due
to the angle of entry of the radiant heat through the window.
Flash
burns were largely confined to exposed areas of the body, but on occasion would
occur through varying thicknesses of clothing the more likely it was to give
complete protection against flash burns. One woman was burned over the shoulder
except for a T-shaped area about one-fourth inch in breadth; the T-shaped area
corresponded to an increased thickness of the clothing from the seam of the
garment. Other people were burned through a single thickness of kimono but were
unscathed or only slightly affected underneath the lapel. In other instances,
skin was burned beneath tightly fitting portions. Finally, white or light
colors reflected heat and afforded some protection; people wearing black or
dark-colored clothing were more likely to be burned.
Other
injuries.--Because of the combination of
factors at the area near the center of the explosion, the casualty effects of
blast are hard to single out. If it is remembered that even directly under the
explosion, people were several hundred feet away from the air-burst, it will be
easier to understand why true blast effects were relatively rare. Only toward
the periphery of the affected zone was the blast effect lateral and likely to
throw people violently against buildings, and at the periphery the intensity of
the blast had fallen off sharply. Comparatively few instances were reported of
arms or legs being torn from the body by flying debris. Another indication of
the rarity of over-pressure is the scarcity of ruptured eardrums. Among 106
victims examined by the Japanese in Hiroshima on 11 and 12 August, only three
showed ruptured eardrums; a study done in October at the Omura hospital near
Nagasaki revealed that only two of 92 cases had ruptured eardrums. Only at
Nagasaki were there reports of over-pressure in the shock wave. Some of the
dead were said by survivors to have had their abdomens ruptured and intestines
protruding; others were reported to have protruding eyes and tongues, and to
have looked as if they had drowned. Thorough check by Allied investigators
discredited these stories as evidence of direct
blast
effects; the normal effects of blast are internal hemorrhage and crushing.
These external signs point to injuries from debris rather than blast.
Injuries
produced by falling and flying debris were much more numerous, and naturally
increased in number and seriousness nearer the center of the affected area. The
collapse of the buildings was sudden, so that thousands of people were pinned
beneath the debris. Many were able to extricate themselves or received aid in
escaping, but large numbers succumbed either to their injuries or to fire
before they could be extricated. The flimsiness of Japanese residential
construction should not be allowed to obscure the dangers of collapse; though
the walls and partitions were light, the houses had heavy roof timbers and
heavy roof tiles. Flying glass from panels also caused a large number of
casualties, even up to 15,000 feet from ground zero.
The
number of burns from secondary fires was slight among survivors, but it was
probable that a large number of the deaths in both cities came from the burning
of people caught in buildings. Eyewitness accounts agree that many fatalities
occurred in this way, either immediately or as a result of the lack of care for
those who did extricate themselves with serious burns. There are no references,
however, to people in the streets succumbing either to heat or to carbon
monoxide as they did in Tokyo or in Hamburg, Germany. A few burns resulted from
clothing set afire by the flash wave, but in most cases people were able to
beat out such fires without serious injury to the skin.
Radiation
disease.--The radiation effects upon survivors
resulted from the gamma rays liberated by the fission process rather than from
induced radio-activity or the lingering radio-activity of deposits of primary
fission products. Both at Nagasaki and at Hiroshima, pockets of radio-activity
have been detected where fission products were directly deposited, but the
degree of activity in these areas was insufficient to produce casualties.
Similarly, induced radio-activity from the interaction of neutrons with matter
caused no authenticated fatalities. But the effects of gamma rays--here used in
a general sense to include all penetrating high-frequency radiations and
neutrons that caused injury--are well established, even though the Allies had
no observers in the affected areas for several weeks after the explosions.
Our
understanding of radiation casualties is not complete. In part the deficiency
is in our basic knowledge of how radiation affects animal tissue. In the words
of Dr. Robert Stone of the Manhattan Project, "The fundamental mechanism
of the action of radiation of living tissues has not been understood. All
methods of treatment have therefore been symptomatic rather than specific. For
this reason, studies into the fundamental nature of the action of radiation
have been carried on to some extent, the limitation being that it was unlikely
that significant results could be obtained during the period of war."
According
to the Japanese, those individuals very near the center of the explosion but
not affected by flash burns or secondary injuries became ill within 2 or 3
days. Bloody diarrhea followed, and the victims expired, some within 2 to 3
days after the onset and the majority within a week. Autopsies showed
remarkable changes in the blood picture--almost complete absence of white blood
cells, and deterioration of bone marrow. Mucous membranes of the throat, lungs,
stomach, and the intestines showed acute inflammation.
The
majority of the radiation cases, who were at greater distances, did not show
severe symptoms until 1 to 4 weeks after the explosion, though many felt weak
and listless on the following day. After a day or two of mild nausea and vomiting,
the appetite improved and the person felt quite well until symptoms reappeared
at a later date. In the opinion of some Japanese physicians, those who rested
or subjected themselves to less physical exertion showed a longer delay before
the onset of subsequent symptoms. The first signs of recurrence were loss of
appetite, lassitude, and general discomfort. Inflammation of the gums, mouth,
and pharynx appeared next. Within 12 to 48 hours, fever became evident. In many
instances it reached only 100° Fahrenheit and remained for only a few days. In
other cases, the temperature went as high as 104° or 106° Fahrenheit. The
degree of fever apparently had a direct relation to the degree of exposure to
radiation. Once developed, the fever was usually well sustained, and in those
cases terminating fatally it continued high until the end. If the fever
subsided, the patient usually showed a rapid disappearance of other symptoms
and soon regained his feeling of good health. The other symptoms commonly seen
were shortage of white corpuscles, loss of hair, inflammation and gangrene of
the gums, inflammation of the mouth and pharynx, ulceration of the lower
gastro-intestinal tracts, small livid spots (petechiae) resulting from escape
of blood into the tissues of the skin or mucous membrane, and larger
hemorrhages of gums, nose and skin.
Loss
of hair usually began about 2 weeks after the bomb explosion, though in a few
instances it is reported to have begun as early as 4 to 5 days afterward. The
areas were involved in the following order of frequency with variations
depending on the degree of exposure: scalp, armpits, beard, pubic region, and
eyebrows. Complete baldness was rare. Microscopic study of the body areas
involved has shown atrophy of the hair follicles. In those patients who
survived after 2 months, however, the hair has commenced to regrow. An
interesting but unconfirmed report has it that loss of the hair was less marked
in persons with grey hair than in those with dark hair.
A
decrease in the number of white blood corpuscles in the circulating blood
appears to have been a constant accompaniment of radiation disease, even
existing n some milder cases without other radiation effects. The degree of
leukopenia was probably the most accurate index of the amount of radiation a
person received. The normal white blood count averages 5,000 to 7,000:
leukopenia is indicated by a count of 4,000 or less. The white blood count I
the more severe cases ranged from 1,500 to 0, with almost entire disappearance
of the bone marrow. The moderately sever cases showed evidence of degeneration
of bone marrow and total white blood counts of 1,500 to 3,000. The milder cases
showed white blood counts of 3,000 to 4,000 with minor degeneration changes in
the bone marrow. The changes in the system for forming red blood corpuscles
developed later, but were equally severe.
Radiation
clearly affected reproduction, though the extent has not been determined.
Sterility has been a common finding throughout Japan, especially under the
conditions of the last 2 years, but there are signs of an increase in the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas to be attributed to the radiation. Sperm counts
done in Hiroshima under American supervision revealed low sperm counts or
complete aspermia for as long as 3 months afterward in males who were within
5,000 feet of the center of the explosion. Cases dying of radiation disease
showed clear effects on spermatogenesis. Study of sections of ovaries from
autopsied radiation victims has not yet been completed. The effects of the bomb
on pregnant women are marked, however. Of women in various stages of pregnancy
who were within 3,000 feet of ground zero, all known cases have had
miscarriages. Even up to 6,500 feet they have had miscarriages or premature
infants who died shortly after birth. In the group between 6,500 and 10,000
feet, about one-third have given birth to apparently normal children. Two
months after the explosion, the city's total incidence of miscarriages,
abortions, and premature births was 27 percent as compared with a normal rate
of 6 percent. Since other factors than radiation contributed to this increased
rate, a period of years will be required to learn the ultimate effects of mass
radiation upon reproduction.
Treatment
of victims by the Japanese was limited by the lack of medical supplies and
facilities. Their therapy consisted of small amounts of vitamins, liver
extract, and an occasional blood transfusion. Allied doctors used penicillin
and plasma with beneficial effects. Liver extract seemed to benefit the few
patients on whom it was used: It was given in small frequent doses when
available. A large percentage of the cases died of secondary disease, such as a
result of lowered resistance. Deaths from radiation began about a week after
exposure and reached a peak in 3 to 4 weeks. They had practically ceased to
occur after 7 to 8 weeks.
Unfortunately,
no exact definition of the killing power of radiation can yet be given, nor a
satisfactory account of the sort and thickness of concrete or earth that will
shield people. From the definitive report of the Joint Commission will come
more nearly accurate statements on these matters. In the meanwhile the awesome
lethal effects of the atomic bomb and the insidious additional peril of the
gamma rays speak for themselves.
There
is reason to believe that if the effects of blast and fire had been entirely
absent from the bombing, the number of deaths among people within a radius of
one-half mile from ground zero would have been almost as great as the actual
figures and the deaths among those within 1 mile would have been only slightly
less. The principal difference would have been in the time of the deaths.
Instead of being killed outright as were most of these victims, they would have
survived for a few days or even 3 or 4 weeks, only to die eventually of
radiation disease.
These
suppositions have vital importance, for
actually
in Nagasaki and Hiroshima many people who were protected by structures against
blast and fire were not protected against the effect of gamma rays. The
complexity of the problem of shelter protection has been increased by this
necessity of shielding against radiant heat and gamma rays. Fortunately, earth
and concrete will shield against gamma rays, the required thickness varying
with the intensity of the rays.
The
slow and inadequate treatment of victims by the Japanese probably contributed
to the high casualty rates. Many persons could undoubtedly have been saved had
facilities, supplies, and personnel been available immediately after the
bombings. Probably the number of deaths from the true blast effects, flame
burns, or serious injuries from collapsing structures would not have been
altered appreciably; generally speaking, these cases either were killed
outright or else survived. Many of the flash burn cases could have been saved
with tremendous quantities of plasma and parenteral fluids if treatment could
have begun within a few hours after the bombing. Probably the most significant
results could have been achieved with the radiation cases. With large
quantities of hole blood and adequate supportive treatment, possibly 10 to 20
percent of those dying of radiation might have survived. However, it is
doubtful that 10 percent of all the deaths resulting from the atomic bombs
could have been avoided with the best medical care. A more likely figure is 5
to 8 percent.
As might be expected, the primary
reaction to the bomb was fear--uncontrolled terror, strengthened by the sheer
horror of the destruction and suffering witnessed and experienced by the
survivors. Between one-half and two-thirds of those interviewed in the
Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas confessed having such reactions, not just for the
moment but for some time. As two survivors put it:
Whenever
a plane was seen after that, people would rush into their shelters: They went
in and out so much that they did not have time to eat. They were so nervous
they could not work.
After
the atomic bomb fell, I just couldn't stay home. I would cook, but while
cooking I would always be watching out and worrying whether an atomic bomb
would fall near me.
The
behavior of the living immediately after the bombings, as described earlier,
clearly shows the state of shock that hindered rescue efforts. A Nagasaki
survivor illustrates succinctly the mood of survivors:
All
I saw was a flash and I felt my body get warm and then I saw everything flying
around. My grandmother was hit on the head by a flying piece of roof and she
was bleeding * * * I became hysterical seeing my grandmother bleeding and we
just ran around without knowing what to do.
I
was working at the office. I was talking to a friend at the window. I saw the
whole city in a red flame, then I ducked. The pieces of the glass hit my back
and face. My dress was torn off by the glass. Then I got up and ran to the
mountain where the good shelter was.
The
two typical impulses were those: Aimless, even hysterical activity or flight
from the city to shelter and food.
The
accentuated effect of these bombs came not only from the surprise and their
crushing power, but also from the feeling of security among the inhabitants of
the two cities before the attacks. Though Nagasaki had undergone five raids in
the previous year, they had not been heavy, and Hiroshima had gone almost
untouched until the morning of 6 August 1945. In both cities many people felt
that they would be spared, and the various rumors in circulation supporting
such feeling covered a wide range of wishful thoughts. There were so many
Christians there, many Japanese-Americans came from Hiroshima, the city was a
famous beauty spot--these and other even more fantastic reasons encouraged
hopes. Other people felt vaguely that their city was being saved for
"something big," however.
Such
a shattering event could not fail to have its impact on people's ways of
thinking. Study of the patterns of belief about the war, before and after the
bombing, show this change clearly. Prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs,
the people of the two target cities appear to have had fewer misgivings about
the war than people in other cities. Response to set questions indicate that
among Japanese civilians prior to 1 July 1945:
59 percent in the Hiroshima-Nagasaki areas but
74 percent in the other urban areas entertained doubts about a Japanese
Victory;
31 percent in Hiroshima-Nagasaki but
47 percent in other urban areas felt certain that victory for Japan was
impossible;
12 percent in Hiroshima-Nagasaki but
34 percent in other urban areas had reached a point where they felt unable to continue
the war. Further,
28 percent of the people of Japan as a whole said they had
never reached a point where they felt
they could not go on with the war, whereas
39 percent of the people in the Hiroshima-Nagasaki areas said they had never
reached such a point.
These
figures clearly suggest that the will to resist had indeed been higher in the
"atomic bomb cities" than in Japan as a whole.
There
is no doubt that the bomb was the most important influence among the people of
these areas in making them think that defeat was inevitable. An additional 28
percent stated that after the atomic bomb was dropped they became convinced
that victory for Japan was impossible. Almost one-fourth admitted that because
of the bombing they felt personally unable to carry on. Forty percent testified
to various degrees of defeatism induced by the atomic bomb. Significantly,
certainty of defeat was much more prevalent at Hiroshima, where the area of
devastation and the casualties were greater, than at Nagasaki.
Typical
comments of survivors were:
If
the enemy has this type of bomb, everyone is going to die, and we wish the war
would hurry and finish.
I
did not expect that it was that powerful. I thought we have no defense against
such a bomb.
One
of my children was killed by it, and I didn't care what happened after that.
Other
reactions were found. In view of their experiences, it is not remarkable that
some of the survivors (nearly one-fifty) hated the Americans for using the bomb
or expressed their anger in such terms as "cruel,"inhuman," and
"barbarous."
*
* * they really despise the Americans for it, the people all say that if there
are such things as ghosts, why don't they haunt the Americans?
When
I saw the injured and killed, I felt bitter against the enemy.
After
the atomic bomb exploded, I felt that now I must go to work in a munitions
plant * * *. My sons told me that they wouldn't forget the atomic bomb even
when they grow up.
The
reaction of hate and anger is not surprising, and it is likely that in fact it
was a more extensive sentiment than the figures indicate, since unquestionably
many respondents, out of fear or politeness, did not reveal their sentiments
with complete candor. Despite this factor, the frequency of hostile sentiments
seems low. Two percent of the respondents even volunteered the observation that
they did not blame the United States for using the bomb. There is evidence that
some hostility was turned against their own Government, either before or after
the surrender, although only a few said they wondered why their nation could
not have made the bomb. In many instances the reaction was simply one of
resignation. A common comment was, "Since it was war, it was just
shikata-ga-nai (Too bad)."
Admiration
for the bomb was more frequently expressed than anger. Over one-fourth of the
people in the target cities and surrounding area said they were impressed by
its power and by the scientific skill which underlay its discovery and
production.
Of
greater significance are the reactions of the Japanese people as a whole. The
two raids were all-Japan events and were intended so: The Allied Powers were
trying to break the fighting spirit of the Japanese people and their leaders,
not just of the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Virtually all the Japanese
people had a chance to react to the bomb though the news had not reached to
full spread at the time of the surrender. By the time the interviewing was
done, only about 2 percent of the populations in rural areas and 1 percent in
the cities had not heard of the bomb.
The
reactions found in the bombed cities appeared in the country as a whole--fear
and terror, anger and hatred against the users, admiration for the scientific
achievement--though in each case with less intensity. The effect of the bomb on
attitudes toward the war in Japan as a whole was, however, much less marked
than in the target cities. While 40 percent of the latter respondents reported
defeatist feelings induced by the bomb, 28 percent of those in the islands as a
whole attributed such reactions to the news of the bomb. There are at least
three possible explanations of this difference. First, the level of confidence
was quite low in Japan well before the time of the atomic bombing. Prior to 1
July 1945 doubts about a Japanese victory were felt by 74 percent of the
population. By the same data 47 percent had become certain that a Japanese
victory was impossible, and 34 percent felt that they could not go on with the
war. Under these circumstances, the announcement of a new and devastating
weapon
was merely an addition to the already eloquent evidence of national weakness.
Second, the reaction of those at some distance from the target cities seems to
have been blunted by their direct experience with other sorts of misfortunes
and hardships, the common phenomenon of psychological distance increasing with
geographical distance. In Japan as a whole, for example, military losses and
failures, such as those at Saipan, the Philippines, and Okinawa, were twice as
important as this atomic bomb in inducing certainty of defeat. Other raids over
Japan as a whole were more than three times as important in this respect.
Consumer deprivations, such as food shortages and the attendant malnutrition,
were also more important in bringing people to the point where they felt they
could not go on with the war.
Third,
the lack of understanding of the meaning of the new weapon in areas away from
the target undoubtedly limited its demoralizing effect. As distance from the
target cities increased, the effectiveness of the bombs in causing certainty of
defeat declined progressively:
Group of cities:
|
Percent
of population
certain of defeat because
of atomic bomb
|
|
Hiroshima-Nagasaki
|
25
|
|
Cities nearest to target cities
|
23
|
|
Cities near to target cities
|
15
|
|
Cities far from target cities
|
8
|
|
Cities farthest from target cities
|
6
|
|
|
|
|
Only
in the nearest group of cities, within 40 miles of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, was
there a substantial effect on morale. Were the channels of mass communication
as readily available to all the population as they are in the United States and
had the use of the bomb received anything like the intensive coverage it had
here, the effect on continued support of the war would probably have been
greater. Something approaching such knowledge, of course, probably would have
spread rather widely had the war continued many more weeks, whether sanctioned
by the censors or spread by the ever-active rumor channels so common in the
country.
It
is apparent that the effect of the atomic bombings on the confidence of the
Japanese civilian population was remarkably localized. Outside of the target
cities, it was subordinate to other demoralizing experiences. The effect which
it did have was probably due largely to the number of casualties and the nature
of the injuries received. These consequences were in part the result of surprise
and the vulnerability of the raid defense system. Properly enforced warnings,
precautions and an emergency care organization of the scale of the bomb's
effects might have reduced casualties and, therefore, the effects on morale.
Even
in the target cities, it must be emphasized, the atomic bombs did not uniformly
destroy the Japanese fighting spirit. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when compared
with other Japanese cities, were not more defeatist than the average. The bombs
were tremendous personal catastrophes to the survivors, but neither time nor
understanding of the revolutionary threat of the atomic bomb permitted them to
see in these personal catastrophes a final blow to Japan's prospects for
victory or negotiated peace.
3. The Japanese decision to surrender--
The further question of the effects
of the bombs on the morale of the Japanese leaders and their decision to
abandon the war is tied up with other factors. The atomic bomb had more effect
on the thinking of Government leaders than on the morale of the rank and file
of civilians outside of the target areas. It cannot be said, however, that the
atomic bomb convinced the leaders who effected the peace of the necessity of
surrender. The decision to seek ways and means to terminate the war, influenced
in part by knowledge of the low state of popular morale, had been taken in May
1945 by the Supreme War Guidance Council.
As
early as the spring of 1944, a group of former prime ministers and others close
to the Emperor had been making efforts toward bringing the war to an end. This
group, including such men as Admiral Okada, Admiral Yonai, Prince Knonye, and
Marquis Kido, had been influential in effecting Tojo's resignation and in
making Admiral Suzuki Prime Minister after Koiso's fall. Even in the Suzuki cabinet,
however, agreement was far from unanimous. The Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai,
was sympathetic, but the War Minister, General Anami, usually represented the
fight-to-the-end policy of the Army. In the Supreme War Guidance Council, a
sort of inner cabinet, his adherence to that line was further assured by the
participation of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff, so that on the peace issue
this organization was evenly divided, with these three opposing the Prime
Minister, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister. At any time military (especially
Army) dissatisfaction with the Cabinet might have eventuated at least in its
fall and possibly in the "liquidation" of the antiwar members.
Thus
the problem facing the peace leaders in the Government was to bring about a
surrender despite the hesitation of the War Minister and the opposition of the
Army and Navy chiefs of staff. This had to be done, moreover, without
precipitating counter measures by the Army which would eliminate the entire
peace group. This was done ultimately by bringing the Emperor actively into the
decision to accept the Potsdam terms. So long as the Emperor openly supported
such a policy and could be presented to the country as doing so, the military,
which had fostered and lived on the idea of complete obedience to the Emperor,
could not effectively rebel.
A
preliminary step in this direction had been taken at the Imperial Conference on
26 June. At this meeting, the Emperor, taking an active part despite his custom
to the contrary, stated that he desired the development of a plan to end the
war as well as one to defend the home islands. This was followed by a renewal
of earlier efforts to get the Soviet Union to intercede with the United States,
which were effectively answered by the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July and the Russian declaration of war on 9 August.
The
atomic bombings considerably speeded up these political maneuverings within the
government. This in itself was partly a morale effect, since there is ample
evidence that members of the Cabinet were worried by the prospect of further
atomic bombings, especially on the remains of Tokyo. The bombs did not convince
the military that defense of the home islands was impossible, if their behavior
in Government councils is adequate testimony. It did permit the Government to
say, however, that no army without the weapon could possibly resist an enemy
who had it, thus saving "face" for the Army leaders and not
reflecting on the competence of Japanese industrialists or the valor of the
Japanese soldier. In the Supreme War Guidance Council voting remained divided,
with the war minister and the two chiefs of staff unwilling to accept
surrender. There seems little doubt, however, that the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki weakened their inclination to oppose the peace group.
The
peace effort culminated in an Imperial conference held on the night of 9 August
and continued into the early hours of 10 August, for which the stage was set by
the atomic bomb and the Russian war declaration. At this meeting the Emperor,
again breaking his customary silence, stated specifically that he wanted
acceptance of the Potsdam terms.
A
quip was current in high Government circles at this time that the atomic bomb
was the real Kamikaze, since it saved Japan from further useless slaughter and
destruction. It is apparent that in the atomic bomb the Japanese found the
opportunity which they had been seeking, to break the existing deadlock within
the Government over acceptance of the Potsdam terms.
